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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the sources of skill formation in a modern economy and emphasizes the
importance of both cognitive and noncognitive skills in producing economic and social success and the
importance of both formal academic institutions and families and firms as sources of learning.  Skill
formation is a dynamic process with strong synergistic components.  Skill begets skill.  Early investment
promotes later investment.  Noncognitive skills and motivation are important determinants of success and
these can be improved more successfully and at later ages than basic cognitive skills. Methods currently
used to evaluate educational interventions ignore these noncogntive skills and  therefore substantially
understate the benefits of early intervention programs and mentoring and teenage motivation programs.  At
current levels of investment, American society underinvests in the very young and overinvests in mature
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   In response to the new labor market for skills in which the real wages paid to high-skilled
and highly educated workers have increased while the real wages paid to low skilled and
less educated workers have decreased, there is renewed interest in policies designed to foster
the formation of socially productive skills in economies around the globe. Politicians and
social commentators routinely express concern about the political and social consequences
of growing economic inequality. A consensus is emerging that increasing the skills of the
unskilled will bring them into the modern economy and will alleviate inequality and that
increasing the supply of skilled workers will help to dampen the rising wage or employment
gap between the skilled and the unskilled by making skilled workers less scarce and lifting
the less skilled into skilled status.
Politicians of all parties in the U.S. agree that reforms in finance and in educational
administration are required. Their counterparts in other countries are equally enthusiastic
about policies to raise skill levels.
In this paper, I want to examine the foundations of current policies toward skill forma-
tion. I re-examine the conventional wisdom on these matters as articulated by our political
leaders drawing on a body of recent scholarship that challenges many of the premises that
govern popular policy discussions in many countries. This scholarship suggests that a
broader view of the way skills are produced in a modern economy is more appropriate.
Once this body of research becomes accepted into the mainstream, the public discourse on
skill formation will be substantially altered.
Current policies regarding education and job training are based on fundamental mis-
conceptions about the way socially useful skills embodied in persons are produced. They
focus on cognitive skills as measured by achievement or IQ tests to the exclusion of social
skills, self discipline and a variety of non-cognitive skills that are known to determine suc-
cess in life. The preoccupation with cognition and academic "smarts" as measured by test
scores to the exclusion of social adaptability and motivation causes a serious bias in the
evaluation of many human capital interventions.
1The conventional wisdom espoused by most politicians, educated laypersons and even
many academics places formal educational institutions in a central role as the main pro-
ducers of the skills required by the modern economy. It neglects the crucial role of families
and firms in fostering skill and the variety of abilities required to succeed in the modern
economy. Popular discussions of skill formation almost always focus on expenditures in
schools or on educational reforms and neglect important noninstitutional sources of skill
formation, which are equally important, if not more important, producers of the varieties
of skills that are useful in a modern economy.
The current emphasis in policy discussions on formal schooling to the exclusion of
informal, noninstitutional, sources of learning is a consequence of three blind spots in the
vision of politicians and policy analysts. The first blindspot is factual in nature and arises
from a failure to recognize that learning is a lifetime affair and that much learning takes
place outside of schools. Learning starts in infancy long before formal education begins and
continues throughout life. Recent research in psychology and cognition demonstrates the
vital importance for skill formation of the early preschool years when human ability and
motivation are shaped by families and noninstitutional environments. Success or failure at
this stage feeds into success or failure in school which in turn leads to success or failure
in post-school learning. Early learning begets later learning and early success breeds later
success just as early failure breeds later failure. Formal or institutional education is only
one aspect of the learning process, albeit an important one, and recent research indicates
that it is not necessarily the most important one.
In addition, since the publication of the Coleman Report (1966), we have known that
families and environments -notjust -oreven -schools-playthe crucial role in motivating
and producing educational success as measured by test scores. Failed families produce
low ability, poorly motivated students who do not succeed in school. Policies directed
toward families may be a more effective means for improving the performance of schools
than direct expenditure on teacher salaries or computer equipment. Policies that seek to
2remedy deficits incurred in early years are much more costly than early investments wisely
made, and do not restore lost capacities even when large costs are incurred. The later
in life we attempt to repair early deficits, the costlier the remediation becomes. (See the
evidence in Ramey and Ramey, 1998).
On the other side of the educational process, the work experience and skills acquired
in the workplace in the form of job search, learning by doing and workplace education are
often neglected in popular discussions because they are not well measured. Post-school
learning is an important source of skill formation that accounts for as much as one third
to one half of all skill formation in a modern economy. (See the discussion in Heckman,
Lochner and Taber, 1998.) Because much of this learning takes place in informal settings
outside of educational institutions, it gets neglected by the educational technocrats and
the politicians who equate skill formation with classroom learning. Once we recognize the
importance of informal sources of learning for skill formation, we think about policies to
foster skill in a different way.
A second blind spot in the vision of most educational planners and policy makers is a
preoccupation with achievement tests and measures of cognitive skill as indicators of success
of an educational intervention. It is certainly true that cognitive ability is important in
life, and there is some evidence that the return to cognitive ability has increased over
time. (See however, Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil for a discussion of the fragililty of this
evidence). However, this narrow focus on cognition ignores the full array of socially and
economically valuable non- cognitive skills and motivation produced by schools, families
and other institutions. This emphasis critically affects the way certain early intervention
programs have been evaluated, as I demonstrate in this paper. Enriched early intervention
programs do not substantially alter IQ. However, they substantially raise the noncognitive
skills and social attachment of participants.
Another common error in the analysis of human capital policies is the assumption that
abilities are fixed at very early ages. This static conception of ability is at odds with a
3large body of research in the child development literature. In the early years of life, basic
abilities can be altered. Schooling produces ability; ability creates a demand for schooling.
The early human capital literature as summarized in Becker (1964) suggests a false contrast
between human capital and innate ability as rival determinants of earnings.
A more correct view of ability (or rather abilities) is that they are created in a variety
of learning situations and that ability in turn fosters further learning. More able people
acquire more skills; more skilled people become more able. Dynamic complementarity
characterizes skill and ability formation and our economic models have to be modified to
account for this.
A third blind spot in the vision of most educational planners and policy makers is a
fundamental mistrust of the wisdom of parents to choose wisely if offered choices about
their children's education. There is mistrust of competition and incentives as means of
improving the performance of schools.
There is also substantial mistrust of "unregulated" informal learning whether it is in
the workplace or the home. Although the failure of social planning in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere is widely acknowledged, the social planning mentality is alive and well in the
local monopoly that is American public education at the primary and secondary levels and
that characterizes the provision of public education around the world. Everything we know
suggests that most parents care dearly about the education of their children and eventually
recognize a good school from a bad one. When offered choices and the opportunity to
experiment, most parents generally choose wisely, at least after they have gained some
experience. They can distinguish the good teachers from bad ones, and the good schools
from the bad schools.
Everything we know also points to the benefits of competition. v1onopolists in all areas
of economic and social life indulge their own tastes, and ignore the well-being of their
customers in a way that competitors cannot.
In this paper, I examine the merits of some of the recent policy proposals by examining
4the evidence -orlack of evidence -supportingthem. For example, much educational policy
regarding college attendance is premised on the myth that many bright but poor students
are being denied a college education by the inadequate financial resources of their families.
This belief is the cornerstone of commonly advocated educational policies, such as the
recently enacted Hope Scholarship program.
The entire field of educational research is littered with myths like this that guide public
policy. We are told that reducing class size or increasing per pupil expenditure in primary
and secondary schools will produce substantial improvements in educational outcomes. Yet
most of the evidence points to the contrary. We are told that education produces substantial
externalities -benefitsharvested by others beyond those captured by the people who are
educated. These externalities are said to justify subsidies to education. Yet a careful
reading of the evidence finds little evidence, of such externalities in Western economies.
(Heckman and Klenow, 1998).
In analyzing the evidence for these and other claims and their relevance for educational
policy, it is important to distinguish statements about a world in which there is no educa-
tional policy from the world in which we live. The relevant question is whether we should
increase current subsidies —notwhether there should be any subsidies at all. At a very low
level of expenditure, increasing schooling quality definitely improves schooling outcomes.
Increasing the level of schooling undoubtedly produces externalities when schooling is at a
low level. The current subsidy of direct costs to students at major public universities in
the U.S. is around 80%. The relevant policy question is whether that subsidy should be
increased and not whether there should be any subsidy at all.
Myths abound about job training policy as well. Many economies around the world
have large groups of unskilled workers made obsolete by a rapid shift in demand toward
more skilled workers. A dangerous myth that motivates welfare reform and training policy
in many countries is that it is relatively easy to adapt adult unskilled workers to the modern
economy. Under this view, most of the low skilled people can easily be trained to be skilled
5labor. In this paper, I will demonstrate how high these costs actually are. In an era of
tight budgets, it is far from obvious that investments in low skill workers made obsolete by
changes in technology are justified on any but political grounds. The major cost of such
investment is the diversion of resources away from the young and the more trainable for
whom a human capital investment strategy is likely to be more effective and for whom it
is likely to produce favorable outcomes in the long run.
Also missing from current policy discussions of education and training policy is any
consideration of priorities or recognition of the need to prioritize. In an era of tight gov-
ernment budgets, it is impractical to consider active investment programs for all persons.
The real question is how to use the available funds wisely. The best evidence supports the
policy prescription: Invest in the very young and improve basic learning and socialization
skills; subsidize the old and the severely disadvantaged to attach them to the economy and
the society at large.
Figure 1 summarizes the main theme of this lecture. It conveys two very different ideas.
The first is a theoretical proposition. For the same level of investment at. each age, the
return is higher in human capital when a dollar is spent on the young than when it is spent
on the old. This is so because the old have a shorter time to recoup their investment due
to the shorter time remaining to them. (Becker, 1964). An even more important point not
made by Becker is that human capital has fundamental dynamic complementarity features.
Learning begets learning. Skills acquired early on make later learning easier. More able
people find earning easier.'
The second interpretation of Figure 1 is as an empirical description of the current level
of spending on human resources in the American economy. At current levels of investment,
the returns to investment in the young are quite high; the returns to investment in the
old and less able are quite low. A socially optimal investment strategy would equate
'Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) develop a sequential model of human capital investment at later
stages.
6returns across all investment levels. The central conclusion of this paper is that at current
total investment levels, efficiency would be enhanced if human capital investment were
reallocated to the young.
I. The New American Labor Market: A Quantitative Assessment.
Since the early 80s, the real wages of unskilled American males have declined. Skill dif-
ferentials have widened around the world. The real wages of skilled workers have increased.
Accompanying the decline in the wages of the unskilled is a decline in labor market ac-
tivity, especially among the unskilled. A variety of labor force measures show increasing
joblessness and longer unemployment spells for persons with low skills. This phenomenon
is especially prominent in European countries with inflexible wages for low-skill workers.
Measuring The Loss in the Value of Human Capital Among the Less Skilled
In order to gauge the magnitude of the capital losses imposed on the unskilled by the
new labor market I offer the following back-of-the envelope calculation of the human capital
losses experienced by unskilled workers in the new American labor market.2 For human
capital, a round, and roughly correct, average rate of return across all ability groups is
10%. Thus, for each $10 invested in a person, the expected annual return is $1. Later on in
this paper, I will argue that based on the evidence, 10% is far too high a rate of return for
low skilled and older workers so the calculations I am about to give are biased downward
in estimating the costs of investment to raise quantities of human capital to offset price
declines and restore real earnings. At a 10% return, to add $1,000 in earnings per year to
the average person it is necessary to make a one time investment of $10,000 in that person.
Using a 10% rate, the investment needed to reduce any wage gap is ten times the amount
of the gap.
To put the magnitude of recent developments in the labor market in perspective, con-
sider the answers to the following two questions:
(A). How much would we have to invest in our workforce in 1989 dollars to
2This calculation was first made in Heckman (1994).
7restore real earnings of male high school dropouts and graduates to their real
1979 levels?
This question is meaningful only for men because real weekly earnings for women have
risen or remained roughly constant over the period 1979-1989. A second question is:
(B). How much would we have to invest in our workforce in 1989 dollars
to restore 1979 earnings ratios between lower education groups and college
graduates, without reducing the 1989 earnings of college graduates?
Using a 10% rate of return, it would require an investment of $25,000 in each high school
dropout or a staggering $214 billion in 1989 dollars to restore male high school dropouts
participating in the workforce to their 1979 real earnings level. To restore all high school
graduates to their real 1979 levels would take an investment of $10,000 per high school
graduate, or more than $212 billion 1989 dollars, for a total of $426 billion in 1989 dollars.
The answer to question B is even larger. Table 1 shows the amount needed to restore
the 1979 earnings ratio between high school graduates or high school dropouts and college-
educated full-time workers over age 25. To restore real earnings for both male and female
workers over age 25 that are high school educated or less to their 1979 relative positions
with respect to college graduates (holding the latter at 1989 real wage levels) would require
an investment of more than 1.66 trillion dollars. These cost estimates are optimistic because
they do not consider persons below age 25 or persons who do not participate in the workforce
at the current wage levels. They are also optimistic for another reason: few -ifany -
governmenttraining programs have returns anywhere near 10%, although many educational
programs realize such returns. Zero percent is a much closer approximation to the true
return. One might wish to qualify these calculations in many ways. One might want to
adjust down the rate of return as more difficult-to-train persons receive training.
A more sophisticated calculation accounts for the fact that as persons have their skills
upgraded, the real wages of the less skilled workers are likely to increase as they become
more scarce and the real wages of those with higher skills are likely to decrease as their sup-
8ply increases. This calculation gives us another gauge of the magnitude of the investment
required to offset the changes in the price of skills in the modern American labor market.
The 1979-1989 percentage change in relative wages of college graduates relative to high
school graduates in the U.S. is roughly 14 percentage points. To reverse the ten-year trend
by increasing the suppiy of skilled workers requires a once and for all increase of approx-
imately 20% in the number of high-skilled persons in the workforce. College equivalents
are 40% of the workforce and high school equivalents are 60%. For a 1990 workforce of
120 million, about 5.4 million people would have to be transformed to college equivalents
to reverse the decade-long erosion of real wages. To maintain this gain in relative wages
against the secular trend operating against unskilled labor, about one million additional
skilled persons need to be added to the workforce each year on top of the once and for all
change of 5.4 million.
As a benchmark, the annual supply of high-skill equivalents to the U.S. economy in the
early 1990s is approximately 1.8 million persons. Maintenance of existing skill gaps alone
would require that the percentage of persons acquiring post-secondary skills would have to
rise by 55%. To phase in the additional 5.4 million people that are required to restore wage
parities to their 1979 levels over a ten year period would require a total annual expansion
of the supply of high-skill persons of 70-80%. In order to engineer such an increase through
a tuition policy, it is necessary to reduce tuition substantially. College tuition would have
to be zero and people would have to be paid to attend school.3 Comparable calculations
for other economies reveal the same large scale of the problem.
Given the magnitude of the required investment to restore real earnings levels, and the
stringency of current government budgets, it is necessary to use funds wisely. Factually
based policy is far more likely to be efficient policy. I now examine the evidence on skill
formation and claims made about market failures and family failures that impede skill
formation.
3These calculations were first presented in Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998).
9II. The Evidence on Credit Constraints and Participation in Schooling and
Training Programs
One of the most widely accepted arguments in policy and academic circles is that credit
constraints prevent poor persons from participating in formal education. The empirical as-
sociation between family income and college enrollment presented in Figure 2 has attracted
an enormous amount of attention in academic and policy circles. The most common in-
terpretation of this evidence is that short-term family credit constraints prevent children
from low income families from attending school. The Pell Grant program and the recently
enacted HOPE fellowship program in the U.S.andmany other governmental educational
programs are premised on this interpretation. It is the most popular explanation for the
time series of the ethnic and racial gaps in college enrollment displayed in Figure 3. Since
minority families are concentrated in the lower end of the family income distribution, their
failure to respond to the increase in the economic return to schooling is widely viewed
as a manifestation of the more general phenomenon of a market failure due to borrowing
constraints that prevent poor people from taking advantage of the increase in the return
to skills.
The common interpretation of Figure 2 and the one that guides many recent policy
proposals for higher education, notes that real tuition costs have increased in percentage
terms over the past 16 years. At the same time, family incomes have declined among the
bottom quartiles of the family income distribution. The real wages and employment of
unskilled males have declined since the late 70s. More families at the bottom of the family
income distribution are headed by females with dependent children. Such families have
lower earnings and income levels than families headed by males.
According to this interpretation, rising tuition costs and declining family resources have
had a devastating impact on the college attendance decisions of children from low income
families. Based on this interpretation, policies that firther subsidize the already substantial
subsidies available to educate children from low income families have been advocated.
10It is certainly true that real tuition costs have risen over the past 16 years both in
U.S. and in other countries. Between 1980 and 1997, average public posted "sticker price"
tuition levels rose by 100% at public four-year colleges and universities and by 77% at
public two-year colleges (NCES, 1997). At the same time, it is important to recognize that
government subsidies to higher education are already large. All told, individuals attending
public institutions of higher education pay on average less than 20% of the total direct
cost of attending college. (Direct cost does not include foregone earnings). iVioreover, a
substantial fraction of the 20% of the total costs borne by individuals is actually paid by
private foundations and charities that extend aid directly to students.4
The conventional wisdom is that borrowing constraints are binding for prospective col-
lege students from low income families and have become more stringent as the poor families
have become poorer at precisely the same time that tuition costs have risen along with the
rise in the return to education. The conventional argument is that government policy
has contributed to the rising inequity in schooling among different family income groups
through expanding tuition costs, so it should also help to eliminate it. I now present reasons
to doubt the received wisdom.
Explanations for the Positive Relationship Between Family Income and Col-
lege Enrollment
The argument that family credit constraints are the most plausible explanation for the
relationship depicted in Figure 2 starts by correctly noting that human capital is different
from physical capital. With the abolition of slavery and indentured servitude, there is no
asset market for human capital. People cannot sell rights to their future labor earnings
to lenders in order to secure financing for their human capital investments. Even if they
could, there would be substantial problems in enforcing performance of contracts on future
earnings given that persons control their own labor supply and the effort and quality of
4Cameron and Heckman (1999) and Heckman and Kienow (1997) discuss the extent of subsidy in greater
detail.
11their work effort. The lack of collateral and the inability to monitor effort are widely cited
reasons for current large-scale government interventions to finance education.
If people had to rely on their own resources to finance all of their schooling costs,
there is no doubt that in the long run the level of educational attainment in society would
decline. To the extent that subsidies do not cover the full costs of tuition, persons are
forced to raise tuition through private loans, through work while in college or through
foregone consumption. Children from families with higher income have access to resources
that children from families with lower income do not have, although children from higher
income families still depend on the good will of their parents to gain access to funds.
Limited access to credit markets means that the costs of funds are higher for the children
of the poor and this limits their enrollment in college.
Current tax law in the U.S. exacerbates these problems. Until recently, borrowing
costs for education could not be written off against taxes. Even if they could be itemized,
few poor families would find it profitable to itemize deductions. Until recently, the only
exception to the nondeductibility of interest in the current tax law was mortgage interest.
Under the new law enacted in 1997, deductions for student loans are available. These
deductions benefit children from families that itemize and are unlikely to have much effect
on college attendance for poor children. All families can itemize mortgage interest payments
in declaring their taxes. However, poorer families are much less likely to own homes and
hence fewer of them are eligible to use mortgages on homes to finance the schooling of their
children.
The purchase of education is governed by the same principles that govern the purchase of
other goods. There is, undoubtedly, a consumption component to education. (See Lazear,
1977). Families with higher incomes buy more of the good for their children and buy higher
quality education as well. This factor partly explains the relationships presented in Figure
2.
An alternative and not necessarily mutually exclusive interpretation of the same evi-
12dence is that long-rim family and environmental factors play a decisive role in shaping the
ability and expectations of children. Families with higher levels of resources produce higher
quality children who are better able to perform in school and take advantage of the new
market for skills.
Children whose parents have higher income have access to better quality primary and
secondary schools. Children's tastes for education and their expectations about their life
chances are shaped by those of their parents. Educated parents are better able to develop
scholastic aptitude in their children by assisting and directing their studies. The influences
of family factors that are present from birth through adolescence accumulate over many
years to produce ability and college readiness.
This alternative interpretation stresses the role of family and the environment and does
not necessarily rule out the importance of short-term borrowing constraints as a partial
explanation for Figures 2 and 3. However, if the finances of poor bitt motivated families
hinder them from providing decent elementary and secondary schooling for their children,
and produce a low level of college readiness, government policy aimed at reducing the
short-term borrowing constraints for the college expenses of those children is unlikely to
be effective. Policy that improves the environments that shape ability may be a more
effective avenue for increasing college enrollment in the long run. The issue can be settled
empirically. Surprisingly little data have been brought to bear on it until recently.
The distinction between long-run family factors that promote college readiness and
short-term borrowing constraints can be conceptualized by imagining an experiment in
which a random sample of families is drawn and some of the families win a million dollar
lottery at different points in the life cycle of their children. Those who win as their children
near high school completion have little opportunity to make cumulative long-run family
investments that contribute to college-preparedness. There would be little effect of the
newly-acquired wealth on the college attendance of their children if college readiness and
ability are the decisive elements in producing enrollment in college.
13For lottery winners with young children, a much larger response to the lottery would
be expected in terms of the college attendance of their children if parents invest in better
schools and more academic opportimities for their children over a longer horizon. If short-
term credit market constraints are the significant factor governing college attendance, then
we expect a large response in college enrollments by children of previously poor families
irrespective of the age of their children at the time the lottery was won.
If public policy aims to encourage college attendance, a focus on improving the en-
vironments of children and improving preparation for college will be more effective than
grant or loan programs to economically or cognitively disadvantaged children in their late
teenage years. What is known about cognitive ability is that it is formed relatively early
in life and becomes less malleable as children age. By age 14, basic academic seem to be
fairly well set. (See the evidence summarized in Heckman, 1995). Since scholastic ability
promotes academic progress, early successful interventions in the life cycle of learning lead
to higher overall achievement. By the time individuals finish high school and scholastic
ability is determined, the scope of tuition policy for promoting college attendance is greatly
diminished.
Only to the extent that the family income of able high school graduates falls below
levels required to pay for college will short-term credit market constraints hinder college
entry. Given the current college financial support arrangements that are available to low
income and minority children in the U.S, the phenomenon of bright students being denied
access to college because of credit constraints is an empirically unimportant phenomenon.
Tuition Costs and College Attendance
It is easy to exaggerate the contribution of tuition costs toward explaining the gap
in the college attendance of children from rich and poor families. Substantial loan and
aid programs already exist that are targeted towards students from poorer families. At
public two- and four-year institutions in the U.S. in 1996, average costs of tuition and
fees were about $2,300. To offset these costs, both the Pell grant and subsidized student
14loan programs are available to children of low income families. Eligibility is determined by
actual college costs and an estimated parental contribution that depends on travel expenses
• and allowances for miscellaneous expenses, the student's dependency status, family income
and assets, and the number of other children the family has in college or postsecondary
vocational training programs. In 1997, a first-year dependent college student is eligible
for a maximum of about $8,000 in Federal grants and subsidized loans. No minimum
contribution toward estimated college costs is required from the student or the parents.
In round figures, the $8,000 maximum benefit consists of $2,500 in Pell grants, $2,500 in
Stafford loans, and $3,000 in Perkins loans. The maximum rises to $11,000 for third and
fourth year college students as subsidized loan limits rise.
A host of other Federal programs direct money to students in some form or another.
In 1996, total institutional subsidies alone were approximately the size of the entire Pell
grant program (The College Board, 1997).
Discussions of college tuition policy focus too often on the elite public and private
institutions and ignore the broad spectrum of community colleges and public four year
colleges that are available to students. They often overlook the rapid growth of community
colleges in the past 25 years. About half of all current college students are in community
colleges. These colleges offer low tuitions (typically about $1300 per year in 1997 dollars)
and flexible schedules that allow students to work and attend college. There are many more
community colleges (1036) than four year colleges (604) and most prospective students have
one nearby so access to them is not a serious problem. Costs of room and board can be
avoided by living with parents. Evidence reported by Kane and Rouse (1995) suggests
that the economic return to a year at a community college is the same as the economic
return at a four year college. Taken at face value, their evidence suggests that there is no
compromise in generating earnings by attending a community college for the first two years
of the college experience.
The growth in community colleges is an institutional response to the rigid schedules,
15high tuition costs and lack of access characteristic of four year schools. Many of the
arguments currently made about the costs of attending college were more valid 25 years
ago than they are now. In the current environment, with the institution of the community
college in place, and with generous loan and grant programs available, the arguments that
tuition costs and commuting are major barriers to college attendance by the poor are
implausible.
To strengthen this argument, note that the take-up rate on Pell Grants and Perkins
Loans targeted towards students from low income families is low (See Orfleld, 1992). Many
more funds are available than are spent. Binding borrowing constraints are not a plausible
explanation for the lack of utilization of these resources. It is more likely that many
eligible persons perceive that even with a substantial tuition subsidy, the returns to college
education for them are too low to pay for the foregone earnings required to attend school.
Some Evidence on the Unimportance of Short-Term Credit Constraints
I now pose and answer two questions: (1) Which factors have the most influence on
schooling attainment? and (2) Is the estimated influence of family income on college
attendance a consequence of long-run family effects or short-term borrowing constraints?
To answer these questions, I compare the estimated effects of family background and
family on college attendance when scholastic ability (AFQT) is included as an explanatory
variable in a statistical analysis and when it is not. Measured scholastic ability is the
outcome of long-term family and environmental factors produced in part from the long-
term permanent income of families. To the extent that the influence of family income on
college attendance is diminished by the inclusion of scholastic ability into an analysis of
college going, one would conclude that long-run family factors crystallized in AFQT scores
are the driving force behind schooling attainment, and not short-term credit constraints.
Table 2 presents a summary of a recent study conducted with Steve Cameron of
Columbia University. Using a subsample of the NLSY data on youth with AFQT measured
before high school graduation, we examine what portion of the gap in college attendance
16between minority youth and whites is due to family income, to tuition costs, and to family
background. Not controlling for ability measured at an early age, about half (5 points) of
the 11 point gap between black and white college attendance rates is due to family income;
more than half (4 points) of the 7 point difference between hispanics and whites is due
to family income. When scholastic ability is accounted for, only one half of one point of
the 11 point black-white gap is explained for family income. For hispanics, the gap ac-
tually widens when family income is included. Equalizing ability more than accounts for
minority-majority college attendance gaps. (See line 5) Similar differences show up in high
school graduation rates and overall college attendance rates that do not condition on high
school graduation. (See evidence in Cameron and Heckman, 1998.) Ability produced by
families and environments accounts for pronounced minority-majority differences in school-
ing attainment, and not financial resources. The disincentive effects of college tuition on
college attendance are dramatically weakened when ability is entered into the analysis of
college attendance. This analysis suggests that it is long run factors that shape ability, not
short term borrowing constraints, that explain the evidence in Figure 2. Programs that
operate late in the life cycle are likely to be ineffective in promoting college attendance and
wasteful of public funds.
Additional evidence in suppport of this point is provided by Brooks-GTrnn and Duncan
(1997). See Table 3. They establish that family income received at early ages is a much
more important determinant of completed schooling -notincome received during high
school or in the college going years. This relationship holds up even when the same parental
background factors are entered in an empirical analysis. This evidence is entirely consistent
with the notion that it is college readiness -andnot credit constraints -thatexplain income-
college going relationship in Figure 2. It is also consistent with the importance of early
interventions in promoting skill formation which I discuss in Section V.
III. Primary and Secondary Schools
State and local governments heavily subsidize primary and secondary education. Virtii-
17ally all direct operating costs are completely subsidized through high school; only the op-
portunity cost of the students' time remains unsubsidized. Many have questioned whether
the amounts spent are adequate. Should teachers be paid more? Should class sizes be
reduced? Many read the latest evidence from the Tennessee Star experiment as suggesting
that class size reductions promise big gains in test scores. Test scores are commonly used
to guide the success or failure of educational reforms. Yet the link between test scores,
especially those measured in the early years of schooling, to later outcomes is at best weak.
(Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999). Fortunately, in recent years, a series of studies
have appeared that link measures of schooling quality to measures of lifetime earnings and
lifetime occupational achievement.
From this literature, there is a growing consensus indicating that within current ranges
in most developed economies, that measured inputs such as class size and spending per
pupil have little, if any, effect on the future earnings of students. (See Beckman, Layne-
Farrar, and Todd, 1996, and Card and Krueger, 1996.) The most optimistic estimates show
a mere 1-2% rise in future earnings for every 10% increase in per-pupil spending; however,
even those estimates have been shown to depend crucially on ad hoc assumptions made
by researchers. vVhen those assumptions are relaxed, the effects of variation of per pupil
spending and class size around sample means are small and poorly determined. (Heckman,
Layne-Farrar, and Todd, 1996).
Even if we take the most favorable estimates from the literature and combine them
with the best case scenario for the costs of raising schooling quality at the secondary level,
increasing spending per pupil is not a wise investment. Table 4 presents estimates of
5Hanuschek (1998) carefully examines the evidence from the widely celebrated STAR program on the
effect of reducing class size on test scores of primary school children and finds little evidence for a strong
effect of the program except on kindergarten children. The evidence on the STAR program supports the
case for early interventions that is discussed below and not the case for a wide scale expansion of class
sizes at all ages. Krueger (1998, personal communication) shows that the costs and benefits of STAR are
about equal and there is little expected gain from the program in terms of its likely effects on the earnings
of participants.
18the discounted returns to schooling quality using the estimates of the quality-schooling
relationship presented by Card and Krueger (1992a). The evidence in the table indicates
that in the U.S. we may be spending too much on students. Taking a high estimate (relative
to the literature) of a 2% increase in future earnings for a 10% rise in per pupii spending,
yields a negative net return of such expenditure increases for all schooling levels. For high
school graduates, the net loss is about $3,800, and for college graduates the net loss is
over $4,400. Unless the same increase in spending raises future earnings by 5% or more
per year, a number far higher than produced by any study in the literature, the financial
costs of school quality far outweigh the returns.6 In order to justify additional spending on
primary and secondary schools, we would need to appeal to other social benefits that are
not captured by earnings.
This evidence does not prove that school quality does not matter. Surely, it does.
We know that increasing it from very low levels, it matters greatly. But, there is little
evidence that marginal improvements from current levels of schooling quality are likely to
be effective. Pouring more funds into schools to lower class sizes by one or two pupils or
to raise spending per pupil by a few hundred dollars will not solve the problems of the
American primary and secondary school system. While the effects of quality vary across
environments and additional funding for some schools may be justified, more fundamental
changes are required if we hope to see a significant improvement in our educational system.
The Benefits of Competition and Incentives
It is widely perceived that American primary and secondary schools are failing. The
evidence for this failure is the dismal ranking of American high school students on stan-
dardized achievement tests compared to the performance of students from other nations.
There is slow growth in achievement test scores, and in the recent past there have been
periods of decline in scores in the face of rising real per pupil expenditures (See Hanushek,
6This calculation wassuggestedto me by Sam Peltzman. Recall further that Heckman, Layne-Farrar
and Todd (1996) demonstrates that fragility of the Card-Krueger estimates.
191998). As a nation, Americans are spending more and more on public schools and ap-
parently getting little in return for all of this expenditure, at least using one widely used
measure of schooling output.7
A sharp contrast is often made between the poor performance of public secondary
schools and the high level of performance of the American college system. Students from
around the world flock to the U.S. to study in our colleges and graduate schools yet our
secondary schools appear to be second rate. How can we reconcile the apparently contra-
dictory story that our high schools are mediocre and our colleges are first rate?
The answer lies in part in the way public schools are currently organized. Public school
systems in the U.S. are local monopolies with few competitors. The American high school
system is a creation of the 20th Century and is a world unto itself. Within it, an artificial
adolescent culture is left to flourish which often discourages academic achievement and
the pursuit of knowledge even in the best schools in the best neighborhoods (Coleman,
1961). The incentives of many principals and teachers to produce useful knowledge, or any
knowledge at all, are weak although there are surely many dedicated professionals. They
are often unresponsive to the changing demand for skills or to the market realities that
will confront their students when they leave schools. They are not accountable to anyone
because it is not easy to monitor them. One valuable source of information -parental
and student perception of the qualities of teachers and schools -israrely used to punish
poor teaching. The educational technocrats dismiss such evaluations as "subjective" and
uiireliable. The parents and students in these schools have limited ability to act on their
valuable private information about bad teachers and bad schools. Poor families have only
limited ability to choose alternative teachers and schools.
An emerging body of hard evidence indicates that competition and choice improves
7Other relevant outputs of schooling such a motivation and self-discipline are not measured by these test
scores. Casual empiricism suggests that with discipline and self motivation have declined among American
high school students but I know of no hard evidence on this question.
20the quality of schools as measured by test scores and by parental and student satisfaction
with learning. Contrary to the view that competition siphons resources away from the
public sector, to its detriment, Caroline Hoxby (1999) has demonstrated that when public
schools are subject to greater competition both from parochial and other private schools,
the performance of all schools increases. Higher levels of achievement are produced at lower
cost. See her evidence summarized in Table 5.
Derek Neal (1997) demonstrates that the higher achievement scores of Catholic school
students compared to public school students demonstrated by Coleman and his associates
(1981; 1987) is a largely consequence of gains registered by inner city students who choose
Catholic schools over inferior inner city public schools. In the suburbs, where districts
are smaller and competition among school districts is more intense, the Catholic schools
have little advantage over the public schools and the performance of both school systems
is higher than in the centralized inner city schools.
Everywhere it has been investigated, the effects of competition in education and training
(and in virtually every other sector of life) are beneficial for the students and trainees. For
example, the celebrated German Apprenticeship System has been recommended as a model
for the U.S. and for many other countries. That system gives high school age students
the choice of integrating work and learning as an alternative to strictly formal academic
education. When stripped to its essentials, the German system differs from the U.S public
school system by (a) breaking down the artificial separation between the world of work and
the world of learning; (b) giving students and the firms that apprentice them choice among
a variety of learning situations and (c) motivating students to perform well in order to
secure the most desirable apprenticeships and motivating many firms to provide valuable
training opportunities. The high level of competition among firms offering apprenticeships
and among students is a major source of its success. (See Heckman, 1994 and Heckman,
Roselius and Smith, 1994).
Once it is recognized that the public schools, especially inner city public schools, are a
21virtual monopoly, while the U.S. university system is highly competitive, the mystery of the
poor performance of the former, and the great success of the latter vanishes. (See Hoxby,
1998). It is remarkable in a society as committed to consumer sovereignty and choice in
most aspects of economic and social life as the American society, that there is so much
resistance to permitting choice and instituting incentives in education. The conventional
argument of the educational planners is that parents and students are not able to make
wise choices. All the evidence points to precisely the opposite conclusion.
Recent research, to which I turn next, suggests that the early years of childhood prior
to schooling are crucial for later success in schooling and life. If parents cannot make wise
choices about the schooling of their children, how can we trust them to make the right
choices for their children in the preschool years? The logical extension of the paternalistic
argument that denies parental sovereignty in schooling would suggest that the state should
play a far more active role in the preschool life of the child as well, a position few would
be willing to accept.
I reject the paternalistic argument for most groups. However, for certain disadvantaged
families such interventions may be appropriate. If we are to violate the principle of con-
sumer sovereignty anywhere in the life cycle process of learning, the case for doing so is
strongest at the preschool stage for some groups and not at later stages of formal schooling
where the argument for paternalism is most often made. Dysfunctional families and envi-
ronments are a major source of social problems. Paternalistic interventions into the lives
of severely deprived children in disadvantaged environments may be warranted. On what
evidence do I base these remarks? What is the case for early intervention?
IV. Early Childhood Investments
Recent studies of early childhood investments have shown remarkable success and in-
dicate that the early years are important for early learning and can be enriched through
external channels. Early childhood interventions of high quality have lasting effects. Dis-
advantaged subnormal IQ children randomly assigned to the Perry Preschool program were
22administered intensive treatment at ages 4-5. Treatment was then discontinued and the per-
sons were followed over their life cycle. These people are now about 35 years old. Evidence
on them indicates that those enrolled in the program have higher earnings and lower levels
of criminal behavior in their late 20s than do comparable children randomized out of the
program. Reported cost-benefit ratios for the program are substantial. Measured through
age 27, the program returns $5.70 for every dollar spent. When returns are projected for
the remainder of the lives of program participants, the return on the dollar rises to $8.70.
As with the Job Corps, a substantial fraction (65%) of the return to the program has been
attributed to reductions in crime. (Schweinhart, Barnes and Weikart, 1993). The Syra-
cuse Preschool program provided family development support for disadvantaged children
from prenatal care through age five. Reductions in problems with probation and criminal
offenses ten years later were as iarge as 70% among children randomly assigned to the
program. Girls who participated in the program also showed greater school achievement
(Lally, Mangione, and Honig, 1988). Studies of early intervention programs have found
short-term increases in test scores, less grade retention, and higher high school graduation
rates among enrolled children. Of those studies that examine pre-delinquent or criminal
behavior, most have found lower rates of deviant behavior among program participants.
See Table 6 for a summary of the effects of selected early intervention programs on student
test scores, schooling, earnings, and delinquency and Tables 7A and 7B for a summary of
the Perry Preschool findings.
Evidence on the more universal Head Start program is less clear, but the program is
quite heterogeneous and is much less well funded than the Perry preschool program. Currie
and Thomas (1995) found short-term gains in test scores for all participating children;
however, most of those gains decayed quickly for African-American children. They conclude
that either differences in local program administration or in subsequent schooling quality
are at the root of the differences between the outcomes for black and white children.
Ramey et. al note (1998) that the schools attended by the Perry preschool children were of
23substantially higher quality than those attended by the typical Head Start child. Thus, the
failure to maintain the initial positive stimulus of Head Start may account for the decline
in its impact over time.
It is important to note, however, that similar declines in test scores were found for
programs like Perry Preschool, but their long-term evaluations are quite favorable. The
psychometric test score literature is not clear about the relationship between early test
scores and success in school, graduation rates, socialization, and labor market outcomes.
The fade-out effects in test scores found for this program do not imply that long-term
beneficial effects of Head Start are not present. Head Start may improve the lifetime
prospects of its participants, despite yielding only short-term gains in test scores.
However, there is some evidence that Head Start may have smaller long-term impacts
than more intensive programs. Studies of Head Start's impact on special education place-
ment and grade retention have produced less dramatic results than have been achieved from
smaller demonstration projects like the Perry Preschool Program (Haskins, 1989). This is
not surprising given the much lower spending per child and quality of service provided
by the Head Start program. Unfortunately, there are no reliable long-term evaluations
of the Head Start program that link interventions to conventional socioeconomic outcome
measures like occupations and earnings.
The weaknesses of Head Start can be attributed to its shorter period of intervention,
lower intensity, and less qualified staff than is typical of more enriched programs (Zigler,
1994). With Head Start, as with most other things in life, you get what you pay for. For
example, children enrolled in the Perry Preschool program received high quality full-time
preschool services for 1-2 years (most received two years), and their parents benefited from
weekly home visits by their children's teachers.
The intervention affected both children and the parents. Parents improve their edu-
cation and labor force activity and reduce their participation in welfare. The successful
enriched programs like Perry Preschool foster long term improvements in the home envi-
24ronrnent which carry over to the child long after the program has terminated. Head Start
offers a much lower quality (and lower paid) staff, part-time classes for children, and limited
parental involvement. The program terminates without any substantial intervention into
or improvement in the home environments of the disadvantaged children. Improvements
in Head Start, proponents argue, are likely to produce effects closer to those observed in
more successful small-scale programs. Given the potential for success (as exhibited by the
Perry Preschool experiment), more studies of the long-term impacts of various types of
small-scale and broad-based early intervention programs are certainly warranted.
Provocative calculations recently published by John Donohue and Peter Siegelman
(1998) indicate that if enriched early intervention programs were targeted toward high
risk disadvantaged minority male youth, the substantial costs of these enriched programs
evident in Table 6 would be more than repaid by the expected savings in incarceration
costs alone.
An important lesson to draw from the Perry Preschool program, and, indeed the entire
literature on successful early interventions, is that it is the social skills and motivation of
the child that are more easily altered -notIQ. These social and emotional skills affect
performance in school and in the workplace. As academics, we have our own bias toward
believing that cognitive skills are of fundamental importance to success in life. Because
of this, the relatively low malleability of IQs after early ages has led many to proclaim a
variety of early interventions to be ineffective.
Yet the evidence from the Perry Preschool program and the evidence in Table 6 reveals
that these programs are highly effective in reducing criminal activity, promoting social skills
and integrating disadvantaged people into the mainstream society. The greatest benefits
of these programs are on socialization and not IQ. Social skills and motivation have large
payoffs in the labor market so these programs have the potential for a large payoff.
I next turn to the evidence on the effectiveness of interventions for older children.
25V. Interventions In The Adolescent Years
How effective are interventions in the adolescent years? Is it possible to remedy the
consequences of neglect in the early years? This question is relevant because cognitive
abilities are fairly well determined or stable by age 8-9 in the sense that IQ is highly
correlated at successive ages beyond that age range. Just as the early intervention programs
have a high payoff primarily due to the social skills and motivation imparted to the child,
and the improved home environment, so do interventions that operate during the adolescent
years, and for much the same reasons.
Table 8 summarize evidence on the effects of adolescent interventions on education,
earnings, and crime rates. Both school-based and training-based programs are compared.
I briefly discuss what is known about school-based interventions during the adolescent years
before I turn to a discussion of training programs for youth and other persons in Section
VI.
A few recent studies of mentoring programs, like the well-known Big Brothers/Big
Sisters (BB/BS) and the Philadelphia Futures' Sponsor-A-Scholar (SAS) programs, have
shown broad positive social ad academic impacts on participating school-age children and
adolescents. BB/BS pairs unrelated adult volunteers with youth from single-parent house-
holds for the purpose of providing youth with an adult friend and promotes private youth
development. No specific attempts are made to ameliorate particular defficiencies or to
reach specific educational goals; a broad, supportive role is envisioned for the mentor. In a
random assignment study, Tierney and Grossman (1995) found that 18 months after being
matched with a mentor, Little Brothers and Sisters (ages 10 to 16 at the time of the match)
were less likely to have initiated drug or alcohol use, to hit someone, to skip class or a day
of school, or to lie to their parents; they had higher average grades and were more likely
to feel competent in their school work and report a better relationship with their parents.
See Table 9.
The primary goal of SAS is to help students from Philadelphia public high schools
26make it to college. The program provides long-term mentoring (throughout high school
and for one year beyond), substantial academic support, help with college application and
financial aid procedures, and financial support for college-related expenses. In many ways,
individually matched mentors serve as surrogate parents, providing a successful role model,
monitoring student progress, and providing other social encouragement and support. SAS
provides students with $6,000 in financial assistance throughout college for those choosing
to enroll in an accredited two- or four-year postsecondary institution. The program also
provides a coordinator for groups of about 30 students to ensure a successful relationship
is built between mentors and mentees. Using a matched sample of non-SAS students in
Philadelphia high schools,8 Johnson (1998) estimates statistically significant increases in
GPA for tenth and eleventh grades, as well as a 22% (16%) increase in college attendance
one year (two years) after graduation from high school (Table 9). Because the primary goal
of SAS was to increase college enrollment, other social and psychological measures were
not studied.
Much like SAS, the Quantum Opportunity Program (QOP) offered disadvantaged mi-
nority students counseling and financial incentives (one dollar up front and one dollar put
in a college fund) for every hour spent in activities aimed at improving social and market
skills. Students who were randomly chosen to participate in the program were provided
with a mentor at the beginning of ninth grade. All participants were kept in the pro-
gram for four years regardless of whether they dropped out of school or not. Over four
years, the average participant logged 1,286 hours of educational activities like studying
with tutors or visiting museums. Two years after program completion. about a third more
participating students graduated from high school (or obtained their GED) than similar
non-participants. Since many participants were enrolled in post-secondary schooling at the
time of the follow-up study, it is difficult to determine the program's effect on earnings.
8Comparison students were matched with participants on the basis of race, gender, school attended and
ninth grade academic performance.
27However, arrest rates for program participants were one-half those for non-participants.
These benefits did not come without cost, however, as the average four-year cost per par-
ticipant was $10,600. Still, a cost-benefit analysis estimated positive net social returns to
QOP. See Taggart (1995) for a more detailed description of the program and an evaluation
of its impacts. Table 10 presents the evidence from a randomized trial evaluation of the
Quantum Program. Again, the evidence is that these programs can dramatically improve
social skills and the adaptation of persons to the society.
Two other studies provide additional evidence that creative programs designed to keep
adolescents in school can be effective. Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
program and the Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD) provided financial incentives for
teenage parents on welfare to stay in school or take GED classes (or, alternatively, imposed
financial penalties for non-enrollment). LEAP showed increases in high school graduation
or GED rates among randomly assigned participants who were still enrolled in school when
they entered the program. TPD showed mixed results on education depending on the
program site. For young women who had already dropped out of school at the time of en-
rollment in the program (and, to a lesser extent, those who were still attending school when
they entered the program), there is a cause for concern that participants may have sub-
stituted GED training for high school graduation as an easier means for meeting program
requirements.9 Both of these programs show positive post- program effects on earnings
and employment for students who were still in school when they entered the program.
The effects were often negative, however, for participants who had already dropped out of
school before entering the program. A key finding from both of these studies is that they
show more positive impacts for individuals still enrolled in school (when compared with
dropouts)Itis still unknown whether that is because, on average, they are of higher
9Cameron and Heckman (1993) have shown that a GED commands lower wages than a high school
diploma in the labor market.
10See Granger and Cytron, 1998 for a summary of both.
28ability than those who have already dropped out, or because there is some advantage to
intervening before adolescents leave school. (See the evidence summarized in Table 11).
The three programs just discussed demonstrate that financial incentives to stay in school
and participate in learning activities for disadvantaged students can increase schooling and
improve employment outcomes. It should be noted that while these programs proved to
positively influence employment and earnings (and, in the case of QOP, reduce crime), they
do not perform miracles. Impacts are modest, but positive.
Two other programs are worth discussing. The Summer ']I1aining and Employment
Program (STEP) provided remedial academic education and summer jobs to disadvantaged
youth ages 14 and 15. Each summer, participants enrolled in 110 hours of classes and 90
hours of part-time work. While the program achieved modest, short-term gains in reading
and math skills, those gains did not last. Two to three years after program completion,
there were no effects on high school graduation rates, grades, or employment. One criticism
of the program was that it did not attempt to follow-up on it slimmer program with a
school-year curriculum. Maryland's Tomorrow program did just that. It combined an
intensive summer program with a school-year follow-up, offering participants summer jobs
and academic instruction, career guidance, and counseling through adult mentors, peer
support, or tutoring. While the program did not reduce final dropout rates, it did seem to
delay dropout (dropout rates were lower during the 9th grade but not by the end of the
12th grade). The program also increased the pass rate for 12th grade students taking the
Maryland Functional Tests (a basic skills test).
These programs suggest that sustained interventions targeted at adolescents still en-
rolled still enrolled in school can positively impact learning and subsequent employment
and earnings.11 These studies also suggest that interventions for dropouts are much less
USee the report entitled "What's Working (and What's Not)?" by the U.S. Department of Labor (1995)
for a more comprehensive survey of programs aimed at increasing the skills and earnings of disadvantaged
youth.
29successful. Unfortunately, they do not tell why. We do not know whether there is some ad-
vantage to intervening before the dropout decision is already made, or if those who choose
to drop out have less motivation and lower ability, making programs less effective for them
(regardless of when the intervention takes place).
We next turn to the evidence on more traditional job training programs. Can they
convert unskilled adults into skilled workers efficiently?
VI. The Effectiveness of Public Sector Training Programs
Due to a lack of data and a bias in favor of the funding of studies of government
training, the returns to private sector training are less well understood than the returns
to public sector training. Studies by Lynch (1992, 1993), Lillard and Tan (1986), Bishop
(1994) and Bartel (1992) find sizable effects of private sector training. In comparison with
studies of public sector training, most of these studies do not attempt to control for fact
that more able persons are more likely to take training, so the estimated rates of return
would overstate the true returns to training by combining them with the return to ability.
Thus, part of the measured return may be due to more motivated and able persons taking
training. Estimated initial returns range from 10 to 20% (Mincer, 1993). (See Table 12).
An important feature of private sector training is that the more skilled do more investing
even after they attain high skill levels. Different types of training and learning have strong
complementarities with respect to each other. To the extent that effective training can be
produced on the job, it is produced in the private sector and not in the public sector. The
best hope of getting a reasonable return from job training is to encourage private sector
investment. Firms are also more sensitive to changing market demands for skills than are
government bureaucracies.
It is important to note, however, that private sector training typically excludes low-
skilled persons. Firms can be exclusive in a way that government training programs for
disadvantaged workers are designed not to be. The lack of interest of private firms in iain-
ing disadvantaged workers indicates the difficulty of the task and the likely low return to
30this activity. The best available evidence indicates that training programs are an inefficient
transfer mechanism and an inefficient investment policy for low-skill adult workers.
Evidence About Conventional Public Training and Work-Welfare Programs
How ineffective are current programs in moving people from welfare to work and in
increasing their employment and earnings? Generally they are very ineffective. They
cannot be expected to produce anywhere near the 10% rate of return that I used in my
initial calculations in this lecture. Consider the evidence for various groups.
Adult Women
Employment and training programs increase the earnings of adult female AFDC recip-
ients. Earnings gains (a) are modest, (b) persist over several years, (c) arise from several
different treatments, and (d) are sometimes quite cost effective. Table 13 displays eval-
nation results for a variety of programs. For example, participation in an Arkansas job
search program was required for AFDC recipients with children over age three. Partici-
pants attended a group job search club for two weeks and then were asked to search as
individuals for an additional two months. A program in San Diego required all AFDC
participants to take job search assistance and mandated work experience. The gains were
high for participants in both programs. The National Supported Work program provided
intensive training and job search assistance at a cost of about $16,550 per recipient. The
estimated rate of return to this program was only 3.5%.
The results from the recent experiment evaluating the Job Training Partnership Act
shown in Table 14 corroborate these findings. The largest impacts are for adult women,
many of whom were collecting AFDC during their participation in JTPA. However, the
impacts are not sufficiently large to move more than a tiny fraction of women out of poverty.
As a general rule, conventional employment and training programs are often cost effective
for adult women (especially if the opportunity cost of trainee time is ignored or is sufficiently
low), but do not produce dramatic changes in participant earnings or employment.
Adult Men
31The evidence for this group is consistent across programs. Returns are low but usually
positive. Job search assistance is an effective strategy but produces only modest increases
in mean earnings levels. For these groups, training programs will not make much of a
difference in closing the wage gap between the skilled and the unskilled.
The oniy exception to this generally poor performance of publically provided training
is in classroom training. Heckman, Hohmann, Khoo and Smith (1999) demonstrate that
the return to classroom training provided by government training programs is comparable
to that provided by the ordinary educational sector for average students.
Youth
Evidence from the recently concluded JTPA experiment indicates that this program
produces only low or negative impacts on earnings. For male youth, the estimated negative
effect is unbelievably low. If taken seriously, participation in JTPA has a more negative
impact on the earnings of male youth than participation in the Army, loss of work experience
or the cost of incarceration as measured by many studies.
The New Chance program, operating in 10 different states, provides equally pessimistic
results for teenage mothers. This program was voluntary for young single mothers ages
16-22, who were on welfare, had dropped out of high school, and had not yet received a
high school diploma or GED. New Chance offered a comprehensive set of services to these
mothers and their children, including instruction in basic skills and in subjects related to the
GED, occupational training, work experience, and job placement services. The program
increased the proportion of young mothers receiving a high school diploma or GED by
8.1%. However, that increase came entirely from an increase of 11.8% in GED recipients.
In fact, program participants were less likely to receive a high school diploma than non-
participants! There were no long-term impacts on earnings or employment (Quint, Bos,
and Polit, 1997, and Granger and Cytron, 1998). Two primary differences between this
program and those just described are immediate. First, participants had already dropped
out of school by the time they entered the program. The impacts for TPD and LEAP were
32much smaller (and mostly insignificant) for dropouts than for individuals still enrolled in
school. Second, New Chance was a strictly voluntary program which attempted to induce
welfare teenage mothers to enroll based on program benefits, while QOP, TPD, and LEAP
provided financial incentives to encourage academic activities.
Only the Job Corps has a demonstrated positive impact on earnings. It is an expensive
program, costing around $20,000 per participant, with an estimated return of roughly 8-9%.
There is some basis for supporting expansion of this program, but even for this program
the evidence is weak. Part of the high return comes from the very large value imputed to
human life and the slightly smaller rate of committing murders found among persons who
participate in the Job Corps. With lower values placed on lives saved, the estimated gains
from Job Corps are much smaller. (See Donohue and Siegelman, 1998).
Jobstart was designed to achieve similar impacts to the Job Corps, without the asso-
ciated costs. If offers less intensive services in a non-residential setting, at a cost of about
$6,000 per participant (substantially more than JTPA training, but less than half the cost
of the Job Corps). Not surprisingly, the savings in costs are matched by a reduction in
impacts. While estimates suggest small increases in earnings and education and reductions
in crime, those effects were typically not statistically significant for the overall sample of
participants. Two particularly problematic subgroups showed large positive impacts on
earnings: men arrested between age 16 and program entry and youth who had dropped out
of school for educational reasons. Previous arrestees also showed some evidence of reduced
crime and drug use as a result of the program. More surprising, however, is the sizeable
impacts reported by one program site -theCenter for Employment and Training (CET)
in San Jose, California.
The CET provides 3-6 months of vocational training to disadvantaged youth and adults,
most of which are high school dropouts. At a cost of $4,200 per enrollee, the program
showed sustained earnings gains of over $3,000 per year (a 40% increase)! The success of
this program is not entirely understood, but it does have a few distinguishing features which
33are suggestive (U.S. Department of Labor, 1995). First, the program has close ties to the
local labor market. An industrial advisory board is set up to aid in skill selection; courses
are taught by technicians from industry; and many area employers are on the advisory
board. Second, CET emphasizes job skills training over learning basic skills. Basic skills are
taught in the context of job training. Third, the CET curriculum is tailored specifically to
the needs of each participant. Fourth, the CET has been active in San Jose for over 25 years
and program staff have extensive local knowledge and contracts. It has earned a positive
reputation among employers, which is likely to help the placement of new graduates.
Training Programs for Displaced Workers
Displacement of older workers with substantial experience in the labor market has
become an increasingly important phenomenon in recent years. In response to this trend,
Congress passed Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act in 1982 and the Economic
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act in 1988.
Leigh (1990) summarizes the evidence on a variety of these programs. Results from
some of these evaluations suggest small to moderate wages gains lasting only about a year.
A more recent evaluation by Mathematica (see Corson, et al., 1993) of training provided
under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act to workers displaced as a result of foreign
trade finds no evidence of any effect of this long-term training program on the earnings and
employment of recipients. Consistent with the other studies of government employment and
training programs already discussed, the overall pattern for programs aimed at displaced
workers is one of weak impacts for most groups. This is in sharp contrast to the high rates
of return for private on-the-job training.
We cannot rely on Federal job training programs to convert adult unskilled workers into
the skilled workers demanded by the modern economy either in the U.S. or in any other
country where their track record is equally poor. (See, Beckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999
for a survey of impacts of job training programs around the world).
Summary of Training Impacts
34A comparison of these programs suggests a few important lessons. First, you get what
you pay for. The JTPA program generally costs very little and produces very little. The
intensive residential nature of the Job Corps was not easily replaced by the less expensive
Jobstart program (with the exception of CET). Second, the effects of treatment may vary
substantially among subgroups. This is not only evidenced by the difference in effects for
the JTPA across age and sex classifications, but it is also observed for subgroups in the
Jobstart evaluation. Third, these types of programs also affect behaviors beyond schooling
and work which should be considered. Both the Job Corps and Jobstart suggest that
reductions in crime may be an important impact of programs targeted at male youth.
Fourth, programs that are highly integrated with the local labor market and private sector
are likely to be the most successful. This supports our claim that efforts should be made to
shift training subsidies to the private sector. It also reinforces the point I made about, the
German Apprenticeship System. It is effective in part because it tightens the link between
the workplace and the school room. The evidence summarized in Heckman, LaLonde and
Smith (1999) indicates that the rate of return to most U.S. and European training programs
is far below the 10% figure I used in my initial calculations and is sometimes negative.
VII. TaxPolicy
The final type of policy I consider is tax policy. Aside from the progressivity of the
current tax system, tax rules in the United States tend to promote human over physical
capital formation (Quigley and Smolensky, 1990). There is some evidence that tax laws
are more favorable towards investment by more skilled and wealthier workers, although
there are elements in the tax code that favor low- skill workers as well. Tax rides also tend
to encourage investments made on the job over investments in formal schooling, especially
schooling that requires substantial out-of-pocket or tuition costs. While many of the effects
of the current tax system on human capital investment thay be unintended, those effects
can be substantial and favor certain workers as well as certain types of investment over
others.
35In order to understand how taxes influence human capital investment, it is helpful to
imderstand its costs and returns. The costs of investment are foregone earnings net of taxes
plus any additional tuition or out-of-pocket expenses. Higher proportional taxes reduce the
costs of spending an hour in school by the amount they reduce the return of working an
hour in the market.
The simplest case to consider is a regime with flat (proportional) taxes where the only
investment cost is foregone income. In this case, changes in the level of the flat wage
tax will have no effect on human capital accumulation. Increases in the tax rate reduce
the return by the same proportion as they rediie the cost, so there is no change in the
incentive to invest. The ratio of marginal returns to marginal costs remains unaffected.
Hence, proportional taxes on labor income have no effect on investment in human capital.
On the other hand, if there are tuition expenses which are not tax deductible, a higher
tax rate discourages investment, because it lowers the returns to investment more than
the costs. In the case of a 10% increase in the tax rate, the return to investment falls by
10%, the cost of foregone income declines by 10%, but the tuition cost remains unchanged
if tuition cannot be deducted, as it cannot be in the U.S. tax system. Thus, the return
declines by more than the costs, so human capital investment is discouraged.
The intuition behind the neutrality of flat labor income taxes on human capital invest-
ment arises from the fact that the cost of time inputs to investment are foregone earnings,
which are tax deductible. If tax rates are 10% and you earn $10 less, you pay $1 less in
taxes—the net loss is only $9. The costs of other inputs to on-the-job training can typically
be expensed by the workers employer and can be financed through lower wages, thereby
making them tax deductible as well. The only major cost of human capital investment that
is not tax deductible is college tuition. While this cost is substantial for some, a majority of
youth do not attend college, and a majority of those who do attend community colleges or
state colleges where tuition costs are modest. Because most of the costs of investment are
financed through foregone earnings and are tax deductible, changes in the rate of a flat tax
36on wages will have little effect on human capital accumulation. (Estimated inter-temporal
labor supply elasticities are small and welfare effects from labor supply adjustment are
negligible.
In a modern society, where human capital is a larger component of wealth than is land,
a proportional tax on human capital is a non-distorting Henry George tax. Taxes on it
should be increased while taxes on capital should be decreased in order to promote wage
growth and efficiency.
However, the current U.S. tax system is not flat. The progressivity in the tax schedule
will tend to discourage human capital investment. For some individuals, the gain in earnings
resulting from human capital investment causes them to move up tax brackets. In this case,
the returns from investment are taxed at a higher rate, but the cost is expensed at a lower
rate. This discourages human capital accumulation. Consider a progressive tax system
where the only cost of investment is foregone earnings. Suppose an individual's current
marginal tax rate is 10%. If he chooses to invest, his increased earnings will cause him to
switch to a marginal tax rate of 20%. In this case the returns are taxed at the 20% level,
but the costs are deducted at the 10%level, and progressive taxes discourage human capital
investment when compared to a flat tax regime.
Taxes on physical capital are another important component of the tax system that can
affect human capital investment decisions. The level of human capital investment declines
when the after-tax interest rate increases, because the discounted returns to investment
are lower. Changing the tax on interest income can have a beneficial effect on both capital
accumulation and on real wages.
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998, 1999) and Heckman (1999), estimate that for
the U.S. economy a revenue neutral move to a flat tax on consumption in the steady
state raises the wages of both skilled and unskilled workers, raises aggregate output by
5% (and aggregate consumption by 3.7%) while raising the wages of college graduates
and high school graduates equally (7%).Sucha move will barely affect overall inequality
37while promoting greater levels of both human capital and physical capital. (See Table 15
taken from Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1999). However, the real effect of these reforms
is on physical capital, and its feedback effects on wages. The effects on human capital
accumulation of these reforms are small. Tilting the bias in the tax system toward capital
and away from human capital will improve the earnings of both capital and labor in the
long run.
Such tax reforms are usually either ignored or misrepresented in popular discussions.
Politicians see such a move as favoring capital and hence rich people. They ignore the
crucial point that higher levels of capital stocks raise the wages of all workers in a roughly
uniform way.
We next consider which individuals are encouraged to invest by the current tax system
and what types of investment they are encouraged to undertake. Various features of the
current tax code are biased toward more skilled workers with higher earnings. For individ-
uals who are employed, investment costs are typically financed through foregone earnings.
To the extent that formal educational expenses are not paid for this way, they can be
deducted from gross earnings provided that they are itemized and that itemizations from
all sources exceed 2% of adjusted gross income. This feature of the tax code tends to favor
high-skill individuals who are more likely to itemize expenses.
Since 1986, individuals have been unable to deduct interest paid on educational loans
from their taxable income. The disincentive effects of his exclusion can be substantial.
While individuals must pay taxes on interest from savings, they cannot deduct the interest
they pay on educational loans. However, mortgage interest is still deductible. It is possible
for families with home equity to take out mortgages to finance their childrens education,
and there is some evidence that post-1986 families have done so. Again, it is the more
skilled and wealthy who are most likely to own homes, so they and their children are hurt
less by a policy that only allows mortgage interest to be deducted.
The tax system favors public schooling investment at the primary and secondary level
38over private schooling and any type of post-secondary schooling. Any student can attend
public elementary and high school for free and the costs of those public schools are financed
primarily through local and state taxes, which are fully deductible. However both private
school and college tuition is not deductible, so the current tax system is biased against
college education and private education. Moreover, the level of tuition tends to increase
with college quality, so the current tax system discourages students from attending higher
quality universities. Since private school tuition is not tax deductible, but local taxes are,
communities have incentives to set up good public schools rather than send their children
to private schools.
The current tax system favors human capital accumulation on the job versus full-time
schooling. Human capital investments can be separated into those undertaken while work-
ing (or paid for by the employer) and those taken elsewhere (and paid for by the individual).
Current tax laws favor the former over the latter, encouraging individuals to seek training
on the job. Virtually all investments made through an employer can be expensed and
financed through foregone wages. The employee does not need to itemize deductions to
realize this tax benefit.
Educational assistance programs exempt tuition paid for by employers from personal
income tax, provided the schooling is job-related. Portable vocational or employer-based
training can be sold to employees by firms and paid for by lower wages. The foregone earn-
ings are essentially written-off on personal income taxes. Individuals seeking training are,
therefore, encouraged to look to their employer rather than formal schools. In addition,
training and schooling expenditures that are not job-related can be immediately written-off
by firms up to $5,250 per year for each worker. However, tuition support is restricted to urn-
dergraduate level education (U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Committee on Taxation,
1992). Again, this shifts schooling and training to the workplace environment.
Relative to physical capital, some types of human capital investment are favored by
the tax system, while others are not. To the extent that many human capital investments
39are immediately tax-deductible while physical capital investments must be amortized, the
current tax system encourages human over physical capital investment. In cases where
schooling or training costs cannot be deducted —primarilytuition costs for formal schooling
—investmentin physical capital is favored. While it is ambiguous as to who current tax
provisions benefit most —themost or the least skilled —employerprovided training is
certainly favored over training undertaken away from the workplace. This asymmetry of
tax treatment is often justified by the argument that there is a much larger consumption
value of academic education than job-specific training and that this consumption value
should be taxed.
VIII. The Conflict Between Economic Efficiency and the Work Ethic
To the extent that there are strong complementarities between different types of skill
investments, there is a conflict between policies that seek to alleviate poverty by investing
in low- skill workers and policies that raise the wealth of society at large. Taking the
available evidence at face value, the most economically-justified strategy for improving the
incomes of the poor, especially adult low-ability low-skill persons is to invest more in the
highly skilled, tax them, and then redistribute the tax revenues to the poor.
However, many people view the work ethic as a basic value and would argue that culti-
vating a large class of transfer recipients would breed a culture of poverty and helplessness.
If value is placed on work as an act of individual dignity, because of general benefits to
families, and especially the early environments of young children, and because of benefits to
communities and society as a whole, then society may be prepared to subsidize inefficient
jobs. Higher subsidies induce people to switch out of criminal activities. However, job
subsidies are not the same as investment subsidies. The evidence points strongly to the
inefficiency of subsidizing the investment of low-skill, disadvantaged workers. Investment
may have some additional non- pecuniary returns. In this case, a purely economic eval-
uation of investment policies may be inappropriate. If, however, economically inefficient
investments are to be made, the cost of reducing the skill gap grows beyond the already
40enormous sun-is presented in Table 1.
41IX. Conclusion: A Life-Cycle Perspective
In evaluating a human capital investment strategy, it is crucial to consider the entire
policy portfolio of interventions together —trainingprograms, school-based policies, school
reform, and early interventions —ratherthan focusing on one type of policy in isolation
from the others.
The best evidence suggests that learning begets learning. Early investments in learning
are effective. Much of the recent emphasis on lower tuition costs for college students is
misplaced when the value of early preschool interventions is carefully examined. In the long
run, significant improvements in the skill levels of American workers, especially workers not
attending college, are unlikely without substantial improvements in the arrangements that
foster early learning. We cannot afford to postpone investing in children until they become
adults, nor can we wait until they reach school age -atime when it may be too late to
intervene. Learning is a dynamic process and is most effective when it begins at a young
age and continues through adulthood. The role of the family is crucial to the formation of
learning skills, and government interventions at an early age that mend the harm done by
dysfunctional families have proven to be highly effective.
The returns to human capital investments are greatest for the young for two reasons: (a)
younger persons have a longer horizon over which to recoup the fruits of their investments
and (b) skill begets skill. Skill remediation programs for adults with severe educational
disadvantages are much less efficient compared to early intervention programs. So are train-
ing programs for more mature displaced workers. The available evidence clearly suggests
that adults past a certain age and below a certain skill level obtain poor returns to skill
investment. A reallocation of hinds from investment in the old and unskilled to the young
and more trainable for whom a human capital strategy is more effective is likely to produce
more favorable outcomes in the long run. Figure 1 succinctly states the argument. At
current levels of investment, marginal returns are highest for the young.
Current training policies need to be re-considered. Private training programs have two
42advantages that public training programs do not: they can train workers who are likely to
benefit most, and they can tailor their training programs to market needs. While public
training programs sometimes yield increases in participant earnings, those increases fall far
short of those estimated for private training programs. To the extent this is true, incentives
to promote private sector training should be expanded and ineffective public sector training
programs should be re-evaluated and eliminated. Firms are likely to choose younger and
more able workers to train, rather than expending resources on older and more difficult to
train workers who will gain little from additional investments.
For older unskilled workers whose skills have been made obsolete by newer modes of
production, wage subsidies offer a more efficient alternative for raising their incomes. (See
the discussion in Phelps, 1997.) By encouraging work rather than unemployment and crime,
wage subsidies may also provide social benefits that extend beyond individual increases in
earnings.
All levels of government subsidize higher education, and those subsidies benefit both irn-
skilled and skilled workers. The argument for increasing the current high level of subsidies
however, is not well documented. The evidence that borrowing constraints are important
deterrents to college attendance is very weak. Students from low-income families tend to
have much lower college attendance rates for reasons other than their inability to meet
tuition and living expenses. Lower family income levels are associated with less productive
family and neighborhood environments as well as lower motivation and ability by prospec-
tive students. These are factors not so easily remedied by student loans or fellowships.
The available evidence does not suggest that additional loans or subsidies are necessary to
alleviate credit constraints. There is no evidence that suggests that massive externalities
to education exist at current levels of subsidy that require an expansion of existing levels
of subsidy to education (Heckman and Kienow, 1998).
Public primary and secondary schools are fully subsidized by taxes. The available
evidence suggests that additional spending on public school quality would be inefficient.
43Instead, reforms in the administrative structure of education and infusion of incentives and
competition are far more likely to be effective.
Given the weak lifecycle labor supply responses reported in the literature. (See Brown-
ing, Hansen and Heckman, 1999) a proportional tax on human capital is a Henry George
tax with no distorting effects on human capital accumulation. Reforms to eliminate pro-
gressivity in the tax system will have only small effects on human capital accumulation.
Far more important for wage growth and economic efficiency are reforms in the taxation of
capital. Promoting capital formation raises the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers
with only slight effects on inequality in earnings.
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50</ref_section>Table 1
Investment in Human Capital Required to Restore Earnings to 1979 Levels
and to Restore 1979 Relative Wage Ratios
Using a 10% Rate of Return
(in billions of dollars)
To Restore Earnings to 1979 Levels
Males
Investment needed to restore average male high school dropout earnings in$214
1989 to average real earnings of male high school dropouts in 1979
Investment needed to restore average male high school graduate earnings in$212
1989 to average real earnings levels of male high school graduates in 1979
TOTAL $426
To Restore 1979 Earnings Ratios
Males
Investment needed to restore average male high school dropout earnings in$382
1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high school dropout/college
earnings ratio (holding 1989 college graduate wages fixed)
Investment needed to restore average male high school graduate earnings in$770
1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high school graduate/college
earnings ratio (holding 1989 college graduate wages fixed)
Females
Investment needed to restore average female high school dropout earnings in$136
1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high school dropout/college
earnings ratio (holding 1989 college graduate wages fixed)
Investment needed to restore average female high school graduate earnings$378
in 1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high school
graduate/college earnings ratio (holding 1989 college graduate wages fixed)
TOTAL $1.66 Trillion
Source: Wages are from Blank (1994). We assume workers work 50 weeks a year. The figures on
the educational breakdown for the labor force are from Table #616, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1992. We delete all persons out of the labor force and those less than age 25. On
these criteria, our estimated investment costs are downward-biased.Table 2
Change in minority college entry probabilities at age 24 conditional
on high school completion (minorities vs. whites)
Without AFQT Score With AFQT Score
BlacksHispanicsBlacks Hispanics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Equating All Family .10 .11 .08 .05
Background Components
Individual Components
(la) Number of Siblings .03 .03 .02 .01
(ib) Highest Grade of Father .08 .03 .06 .02
(ic) Highest Grade of Mother .003 .05 -.005 .02
(id) Broken Home -.01 .01 -.002 .01
(2) Equating Family Income .05 .03 .004 -.02
(3) Equating Local Average Wages.004 .04 .002 .03
(4) Equating Tuition and -.03 -.05 -.02 -.05
College Proximity
(5) Equating AFQT Scores na na .15 .12
(6) Equating 1 and 2 .14 .13 .08 .03
(7) Equating 1, 2, 3 and 4 .12 .12 .06 .01
(8) Equating 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 na na .21 .13
(9) Gap between Whites .11 .07 .11 .07
and Minorities
Notes:
Source: Cameron and Heckman (1999).Table 3
Income Effects across the Life Span: Integration and
Interpretation Effects of the Ages over 'Which Parents' Income
is Measured on Children's Completed Schooling*
Parental Income Averaged over Ages
Income Measure**11-150-15 0-5 6-10 11-15
Average Income0.06*** 0.11 0.14***-0.02 0.04
($10,000) (0.01)(0.02)(0.04)(0.03) (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.1620.164 0.169
Notes:
*Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for mother's
schooling, family structure, race, sex, and the age of the mother at the birth
of the child.
*Income inflated to 1992 price levels using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-UX1).
**Coefficient is at least twice its standard error.
Source: Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997)Table 4
School Quality
Discounted Net Returns to Raising












Source: Heckman, Lochner, Smith and Taber (1997).Table 5
Effects of Competition among Public School Districts1'2
Effect on Per Pupil Spending 17% decrease
Effect on Student Achievement 3—percentile point
as Measured by Test Scores improvement
Effect on Student Achievement 4% increase
as Measured by Wages
Effect on Student Acheivement 0.4 additional years of
as Measured by Educational Attainment education
Effect on Parents' Involvement in Their 30% increase in parents'
Students's School Career visits to schools
Effect on Public Schools' Per-Pupil approximately 0
Spending
Effect on Achievement of Public School8-percentile point
Students as Measured by Test Scores improvement
Effect on Achievement of Public School12% increase
Students as Measured by Wages
Effect on Achievement of Public School12% increase in
Students as Measured by Educational probability of college
Attainment graduation
1Notes:
1. Consider an increase of 1 standard deviation in the number of school
districts in a metropolitan area or a decrease of 1 standard deviation in the
cencentration of enrollment among school districts in a metropolitan area.
2. Note that smaller effects are found for metropolitan areas in which
school districts do not have financial autonomy (most revenue is state-determined).
3. Consider an increase in exogenous tuition subsidies of $1000 or an
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PRESCHOOL EFFECTS RELATED TO ECONOMIC BENEFITS
OUTCOME VARIABLE PRESCHOOL (N) NO-PRESCHOOL (N)
EducationEffects
California Achievement Test at 172.8 (54) 145.5 (55)
Age 9 122.2 (49) 94.5 (46)
California Achievement Test at 15% (54) 35% (58)
Age 14 67% (58) 49% (63)
Classified Mentally Retardedb
Graduated from High School
Employment Effects
Employed at Age 19 50% (58) 32% (63)
Monthly Earnings at Age 28 S1,129 (54) 5766 (61)
Crime Effects
Arrested by Age 19 31% (58) 51% (63)
5 or More Arrests by Age 28 7% (58) 35% (63)
Welfare Effects
Received Welfare at Age 19 18% (58) 32% (63)
Received Welfare at Age 28 59% (58) 80% (63)
Notes:
aAll group differences statistically significant at .05 level.
bAt least one year in a classroom for "educably mentally impaired" children.
Source: Schweinkart, Barnes and Weikart (1993).Table 7B
PRESENT VALUE OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
PER CHILD
RECIPIENTS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
COST OR BENEFITWHOLE SOCIETYPRESCHOOL
PARTICIPANTS
GENERAL PUBLIC












































Total Benefits $108,002 $19,569 $88,433
Net Present Value $95,646 $19,569 $76,077
Notes:
aCosts and cost increases appear as negative numbers.
bSome small portion of college costs are likely to have been borne by the participants, but these
could not be estimated from the available information.
CThe benefits reported include all costs paid bythe employer to hire a participant. Allocation to
participants and the general public assume that: a) the marginal tax rate is 25%, b) the value of
fringe benefits received by the employee equals 10% of salary, and c) the value of other fringes paid
by the employer (e.g., the employer's share of social security) equals 10% of salary.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimated Benefits of Mentoring Programs
Outcome Measure Change
Big/Brothers/Big Sisters
Initiating Drug Use -45.8%
Initiating Alcohol Use -27.4%
Number of Times Hit Someone -31.7%
Number of Times Stole Something -19.2%
Grade Point Average (1-4 scale) 3Q%*
Skipped Class
Skipped Day of School
Trust in Parent 2.7%**
Lying to Parent
Peer Emotional Support 2.3%*
Sponsor-A- S cho1ar
10th Grade GPA (1-100 scale) 2.9
11th Grade GPA (1-100 scale) 2.5
Percent Attending College (1 year after H.S.)32.8%
Percent Attending College (2 years after H.S.) 28.1%
Notes:
Tierney and Grossman (1995) and Grossman and Johnson (1998)
*StatisticJly significant at .10 level.
**Statistically significant at .05 level
***Statistically signficant at .01 level
aFor the Sponsored-A-Scholar program, only impacts that are statistically.Table 10







Has high school diploma 63% 43% +20%
Has GED certificate 25% 9% +16%
ENRO LLMENT
Currently in 4-year college 23% 14% +9%
Currently in a 2-year college 34% 11% +23%
Currently in training 18% 2% +16%
Currently in GED 4% 11% -7%
Currently in college, training,or GED 78% 38% +40%
EMPLOYMENT
Currently employed full time 20% 7% +13%
Currently employed part time 16% 18% -2%
Currently not in school, training, or work14% 48% -34%
Average yearly earnings all $1748 $1591+S157
Percent with annual earnings >0 56% 28% +28%
CHILD-BEARING
Average children ever parented .54 .75 -.21
Percent with child ever parented 39% 41% -2%
DEPENDENCY
Self receiving food stamps 22% 43% -21%







Percent ever arrested 19% 23% -4%
Average number arrests in all .28 .56 - .28
Percent males ever arrested 27% 39% -12%
Average number arrests (males) .46 1.05 -.59
Percent ever incarcerated 13% 21% -8%
Average number incarcerations all .21 .49 -.28
Percent males ever incarcerated 23% 50% -27%
Average males ever incarcerated .38 .94 - .56
GRADUATED HIGH SCHOOLORGED68% 42% +26%
Enrolled in 4-year college: 32% 17% +15%
Enrolled in 2-year college: 28% 4% +24%
Enrolled in job-training: 8% 8% 0%
Still in high school or GED: 12% 4% +8%
Employed, out of school: 0% 0% 0%
Not in school or working: 24% 62% -38%
Plans to complete 4-year college: 56% 17% +39%
Plans to complete 2-year college: 28% 13% +15%
Plans to complete job training: 12% 54% +42%
No plans for college or training: 4% 16% -12%
Source: Taggert (1995).Table 11
















New Chance 8.1*** 35*** 2.8 -3
LEAP
Not Enrolled -3.4 -1.1 4.6* 8










The follow-up periods for outcomes are approximately 42 months for New Chance,
36 months for LEAP, and 78 months for TPD.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as:=1%;=5%;=10%.
Source: Granger and Cytron (1998)Table 12






PSID, all males 23.5 8
EOPP, young newhires 8.7 3
NLS 16.0 3
NLS (Old NLS) 26.0 4
Souice: Mincer (1993)Table 13
Experimental Estimates of the Impact of Employment and Training Programs on
the Earnings of Female




Services Tested! Participant After After
Demonstration 1 Year 3 Years
Job Search
Assistance:
Arkansas 140 220** 410**
Louisville(WIN-i) 170 350** 530**
CookCounty, IL 190 10 NA
Louisville(WIN-2) 280 560** NA
JobSearch Assistance and
TrainingServices:
West Virginia 320 20 NA
Virginia 520 90 330*
Employment
Services
SanDiegol 770 600** NA
(EPP/EWEP)
San Diego II 1,120 430** NA
(SWIM)
Baltimore 1,160 190 630**
New Jersey 960 720*
Maine 2,450 140 1,140Work Experience
and
Retraining.
AFDC Homemaker 11,550 460** NA
-Health Care
NationalSupported 16,550 460** 810**
Work
Notes:
**Statisticallysignificant at the .5 level. N.A. =notapplicable
Note: All figures in the table are expressed in 1990 dollars. Source: Bell and Reesman (1987), Tables
3 and 4; Couch (1992), Table 1; Gueron, and Pauly (1991), pp. 15-20.Table 14
Impacts on Total 18-Month Earnings and
Employment:










In dollar $ 539" S 550 $ -182 S -854"
As a percentage 7.2% 4.5% -2.9% -7.9%
Percentage employed 2.1%" 2.8" 2.8 1.5
Sample size 6,474 4,419 2,300 1,748




jn$ 873b $ 935b $ 295b 5_1,355b
Asa% 12.2% 6.8% -4.6% -11.6%
Percentage employeda 35b 48b 45b 2•4b
any time during the follow-up period.
bTests of statistical significance were not performed for impacts per enrollee.
'St tt 11 significant at the .10 level;
"Statistically at the .05 level;
"Statistically at the .01 level (two-tailed test).
Source:Bloom,Orr. Cane, Bell, and Doolittle (1993). Enrollee estimates obtained using the procedure in Bloom (1984).Table 15
Closed Economy Effects of Alternative Tax Proposals
General Equilibrium (Steady State) and Partial Equilibrium Effects
Percentage Difference from Progressive Caset
Table continues on next page
FlatTax Flat Cons. Tax
PEGEPE GE
After Tax Interest Rate 0.001.9617.65 3.31
Skill Price College BC 0.00-1.310.00 3.38
Skill Price HS HC 0.00-0.010.00 4.65
Stock of Physical Capital -15.07-0.7986.50 19.55
Stock of College BC 22.412.82-15.77 1.85
Stock of ITS HC -9.940.901.88 0.08
Stock of College BC per College Graduate3.042.55-4.08 1.72
Stock of ITS BC per ITS Graduate 1.841.07-5.23 0.16
Aggregate Output -0.091.1515.76 4.98
Aggregate Consumption -0.080.167.60 3.66
Mean Wage College 3.392.600.12 6.96
Mean Wage BS 2.442.440.25 6.82
Standard Deviation Log Wage 4.091.56-1.94 0.69
College/HS Wage Premium at 10 Yrs EXP*1.92-0.453.10 0.18
Fraction attending college 18.790.26-12.18 -1.92
Type 1: Fraction Attending College 50.29-1.25-42.57 2.14
Type 2: Fraction Attending College 28.50-5.89-15.60 -7.88
Type 3: Fraction Attending College 14.13-6.93-5.20 -9.56
Type 4: Fraction Attending College 15.276.13-11.77 7.50
Type 1: College BC Gain First 10 Years**5.813.12-7.53 1.51
Type 2: College BC Gain First 10 Year?*5.332.86-6.84 1.38
Type 3: College BC Gain First 10 Years**5.603.10-6.70 1.61
Type 4: College BC Gain First 10 Years**6.854.17-6.41 2.56
Type 1: HS BC Gain First 10 Years** 3.421.06-7.79 -0.34
Type 2: BS BC Gain First 10 Years** 4.491.97-7.60 0.46
Type 3: BS BC Gain First 10 Years** 5.362.67-7.62 1.06

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































General equilibrium (GE) effects allow skill prices to change, while partial equilibrium
(PE) effects hold prices constant.
tI the progressive case we allow for a progressive tax on labor earnings, but assume
a flat tax on capital at 15%.
In the flat tax regime we hold the tax on capital fixed to the same level as the
progressive tax, but the tax on labor income is flat as is calculated to balance the budget
in the new GE steady state. This yields a tax rate on labor income of 7.7%. In the
consumption regime, we tax only consumption at a 10.0% rate, again balancing the budget
in steady states.
*The college -highschool wage premium measures the differences in log mean earnings
between college graduates and high school graduates with ten years of experience.
**These rows present changes in the ratio of human capital at ten years of experience
versus human capital upon entering the labor force.
Source: Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1999.